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Abstract 
This thesis explores why international maritime governance regimes have inconsistent 
rates of success.  The global community relies on the world’s oceans for food, trade, and 
resources.  Therefore, the regulation of these oceans is necessary to provide adequate 
passage through its waters and the management of all the resources they supply for the 
mutual benefit of all.  Although there are international laws such as the United Nations 
Convention of the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS), many of these laws fail to address current 
global threats and have proven inadequate in forming proactive collective responses.  It is 
particularly problematic addressing transnational criminal behavior.  I argue that four 
criteria are absolutely necessary to determine whether any collective regimes will be 
successful.  The first of these criteria includes states’ political will to cooperate with one 
another to recognize and address shared concerns.  Secondly, the structure of 
international law needs to be formulated in a way that clearly defines states’ rights and 
obligations.  Third, international law must be integrated into a state’s domestic legal 
framework that would allow the court system to have effective jurisdiction to prosecute 
criminals.  Lastly, states need to have the enforcement capacity to effectively deter 
criminal behavior and strengthen state sovereignty.  All four of these criteria must be 
present in a successful maritime governance regime.  I offer two case studies on this 
subject: The first case study discusses maritime piracy, international efforts to ensure the 
freedom of navigation, and protect international trade.  The second examines illegal, 
unreported, and unregulated fishing which addresses the sustainable exploitation of the 
seas to ensure food security and market stability.  The following cases demonstrate clear 
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evidence that international maritime governance currently lacks effective compliance and 
enforcement. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Under what conditions is effective international maritime governance achievable?  
Maritime governance refers to the framework of internationally agreed upon rules, 
regulations, treaties, etc. that allow the international community to regulate international 
waterways, settle disagreements, and develop processes to address states’ concerns.  
These rules create a regime that determines the balance between defining criminal 
behavior and what can be considered legitimate enterprise.  This topic is important in the 
study of international relations due to its many implications on international peace and 
security, trade, states’ rights to extract resources, environmental concerns, and a myriad 
of other issue areas that require collective action among states.  As a result, there is a 
political necessity to establish rules, regulations, and other codes of conduct, as people 
are constantly traversing oceans to sell goods to other markets and extract resources that 
lay beneath the surface of our oceans.  Governments with interests in the freedom of 
navigation and sovereign territorial rights, enforce these rules on other states, and in some 
cases, upon themselves to protect their national interests.  The economic potential of our 
oceans can also come with major repercussions.  Crime, war, and environmental 
degradation can lead to major problems that challenge governance of our oceans.  This 
thesis will explore some of these challenges to maritime governance and what states do to 
preserve peace and security and maintain the freedom of navigation in international 
waters. 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is the most 
important treaty to legally regulate states’ rights over the oceans and detail the 
responsibilities that states have to ensure global peace and prosperity.  However, 
application of the law has been uneven.  In certain policy areas, such as combating 
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piracy, states have shown they can work effectively with each other, providing much 
needed security to ensure the global economy continues to function without interruption.  
In other cases, collective governance can collapse completely, leaving a vacuum that can 
lead to balance of power scenarios, and with it, conflict that has political, military, and 
economic implications as states seek to gain control of key waterways.  Environmental 
degradation and the depletion of the ocean’s resources further enhance the possibility of 
conflict.  This thesis seeks to understand how and why different states find it difficult to 
address certain issues over others and why there has been an uneven approach to 
addressing different policy areas. 
Several key questions must be addressed to better understand the uneven 
implementation of international law and issues regarding state compliance under a 
regulatory maritime agreement such as UNCLOS.  These questions include: What is the 
structure of the international system and how does the balance of power affect interstate 
relationships?  What effects do international treaties have on state behavior?  What does 
it mean to comply with international law, and what factors lead to noncompliance?  Are 
there structures or systems in place to deal with dispute settlement between states?  Can 
international law be enforceable, and if so, how?  By analyzing these questions with 
regards to the international maritime governance regime, one can begin to understand the 
strengths, weaknesses, and potential areas of reform regarding international law. 
This thesis argues that effective international maritime governance requires a 
combination of political will and cooperation among states, and that compliance requires 
states to accept their responsibilities to adhere to international law.  I have developed a 
research design that seeks to understand state behavior, including when states decide to 
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comply and why states enforce certain rules upon themselves and on each other.  I argue 
that when major powers are detrimentally affected by illegal actions, they work together 
to confront transgressions.  But when major powers are not affected or involved, 
unregulated and illegal behavior is allowed to continue. 
Furthermore, when illegal and unsustainable practices at sea directly affect the 
economies of major states, it will embolden them to act together in order to solve a 
collective action problem.  I further argue that when international law, domestic law, and 
state power are working in conjunction with one another, maritime governance is most 
effective.  When states can declare jurisdiction for violations in international waters, 
formally try criminals and violators in formal courts, and establish an enforcement 
mechanism that can deter future behavior, states will be better equipped to resolve 
collective action problems on the high seas.  However, if political will and any of these 
other criteria fail to exist in an international collaborative framework, collective action 
problems such as piracy or illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing (IUU fishing) will 
continue to go undeterred, presenting even greater problems for states in the future. 
This thesis’ research design is intended to explain and measure the effectiveness of 
maritime governance by exploring state behavior in two important policy areas.  The first 
policy area discusses the international efforts to combat piracy to ensure the freedom of 
navigation.  The second policy area discusses state behavior with regards to IUU fishing 
and its impact on sustainable extraction of resources from our oceans.  In examining 
these policy areas I seek to explain why states are able to, in some cases, coordinate 
together and provide effective governance, while in other cases, states fall short of their 
goals or cannot effectively work with one another.  All case study analyses are qualitative 
7 
 
in nature and will provide an in-depth analysis into why some situations that fall within 
the scope of maritime governance were successful, while others were not.  I intend to 
explain the reasons why the efforts to combat piracy have been mostly successful, but the 
efforts to curb illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing have been unsuccessful and 
continue to erode our ability to sustainably harvest resources in the ocean. 
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Chapter 2: Background and Literature Review 
Anarchy and the Balance of Power 
 To begin understanding the international maritime governance regime, it is 
important to acknowledge how the international system is structured, the role that power 
has on the treaty-making process, and whether states comply with the law once they have 
ratified it.  The international system is often described as anarchical because states do not 
empower a world government to provide security to conduct foreign policy.  The 
anarchic nature of this system enables states to conduct their own social relationships 
with other states by seeking enough power to preserve its existence and to negotiate or 
challenge other states when necessary.  Power is often defined as the production of 
effects that shape state behavior through its social interactions with other state actors 
(Barnett and Duvall, 2005, 42).  Power in this sense is a finite resource that all states seek 
to preserve and possibly gain.  The structure of international institutions reflects the 
asymmetrical power between states.  Power can be exercised in a number of different 
ways; this includes controlling the actions of another state or creating international 
institutions and establishing rules and operating procedures (Barnett and Duvall, 2005, 
50-51).  Power can also relate to the capacity that a state has available to be able to 
provide resources towards a common purpose.  Asymmetry of power often leads states to 
work together to ensure global governance on various subject matters; institutions are 
established to coordinate states’ policies and the writing of international law is a 
construct of the spread of power throughout the system (Barnett and Duvall, 2005, 57-
58). 
 When piracy became increasingly prevalent in the early 2000s off the coast of 
Somalia, states took unprecedented measures to work with each other to combat this 
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criminal activity.  Piracy was allowed to prosper in Somalia due to its poor economic 
conditions leading people to resort to holding boats ransom, severely disrupting trade 
flow in the region (Levin, 2015, 261-262).  In order to better address the issue, developed 
countries worked with developing countries in the region to build their legal capacity to 
try pirates in formal courts and develop national strategies that would proactively go after 
pirates in order to undermine their networks (Beekarry, 2013, 164; Hodgkinson, 2013, 
153-154).  Due to this unprecedented level of cooperation among states, pirate networks 
have been undermined and the freedom of navigation has been preserved (Yurika, 2014, 
347).  This case is often seen as an example of how to better address piracy in other parts 
of the world, including West Africa, where piracy has increased in recent years 
(Hodgkinson, 2013, 155-156). 
It is generally viewed that balancing power in order to prevent the dominance of a 
hegemonic power is essential to stability in a multi-state international system (Claude, 
1989, 78).  Claude further argues that balancing relative power among states also allows 
for promoting expectations of moderate behavior that allow for stability and security of 
the international system (Claude, 1989, 80).  This runs in direct contrast with collective 
security regimes, since collective security requires states to put international peace and 
security ahead of national interest which puts tremendous costs on states to preserve this 
system (Claude, 1989, 83).  Balance of power scenarios allow states to act rationally 
while pursuing their own national interests but it also allows for treaty regimes to 
develop.  Although power is distributed unevenly throughout the international system, 
actions such as sharing intelligence and capabilities among one another have the ability to 
allow states to pursue common interests and close gaps in uncertainty that often prevents 
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states from cooperating with one another or complying with agreements (Nye, 2004, 
261).  When states adhere to certain norms and treaty obligations they can both enhance 
their ability to exert influence while also retaining a reputation as a helpful partner in 
promoting peace and security. 
How Norms Become International Law 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea originally began as 
customary international law, or a law that is unwritten but widely recognized throughout 
the international community.  These unwritten laws are derived from international norms, 
which constrain state behavior based on “shared ideas, expectations, and beliefs about 
appropriate behavior” which is meant to give the international order more structure and 
stability (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, 894).   The beginnings of UNCLOS could be 
traced back to the 17th century, when states determined that sovereign territory be defined 
by the cannon-shot rule, which determined that territorial waters would be decided by 
how far from the coast a state’s cannons were able to fire (Vignocchi, 2015, 792-793).  
Norms are considered successful if they become widely recognized models of successful 
diplomacy, or diffuse in states’ recognition (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, 906); norms 
recognizing maritime boundaries fit this criteria and had been enforced long before 
UNCLOS, thus proving the strength of international norms recognizing sovereignty of 
territorial waters (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, 906-907). 
Although the law of the sea norms persisted for centuries, there was a strong push 
after World War II towards codifying these norms into legally binding treaties.  Treaties 
by nature are meant to constrain state behavior and place reputational costs onto a state 
that breaks treaty obligations (Simmons and Hopkins, 2005, 623).  By signing a treaty, a 
11 
 
state has committed to a certain policy position and stakes its own reputation by 
complying to the terms of that particular treaty; this is due to the fact that there are 
usually domestic reforms that may need to take place and there are major consequences 
for reneging on an agreement (Simmons, 2000, 819; Simmons and Hopkins, 2005, 624).  
Most every country has either signed and ratified UNCLOS or has complied with its 
basic tenants.  However, noncompliance is still a major area of concern. 
Treaty Compliance 
 The most difficult challenges regarding compliance are encountered when 
international law is in the process of implementation.  Treaty compliance is one of the 
basic principles of international norms (Chayes and Chayes, 1993, 185).  However, 
treaties are often viewed as an endogenous behavior; states are more willing to ratify 
treaties that they are already likely to comply with and will shy away from treaties that 
they are more likely to violate.  Additionally, negotiating more favorable terms often has 
costs associated with it (Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom, 1996, 383).  The Law of the Sea 
negotiations revealed that there were many divergent national interests.  Some states were 
not able to obtain all their objectives and settle for a more satisfying deal was more 
palatable for the international community at large (Chayes and Chayes, 1993, 183).  
Evidence has shown that international agreements are mostly complied with because 
states generally do not have to make considerable reforms, even in the absence of a 
treaty, to be in compliance to the terms dictated in the agreement (Downs, Rocke, and 
Barsoon, 1996. 379-380).  Treaties are voluntary, so if a state does not wish to enter into 
an agreement that is linked to its national interests, it will not become a party to that 
agreement (Chayes and Chayes, 1993, 179). 
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However, some scholars believe that international agreements actually have the 
ability to alter state behavior, relationships, and expectations among parties to the 
agreement (Chayes and Chayes, 1993, 176).  This is due to the fact that the terms of any 
treaty are often debated at the intergovernmental level for many years; UNCLOS took ten 
years to negotiate and included multiple committees and working groups to discuss a 
variety of related topics that would shape the final agreement (Chayes and Chayes, 1993, 
182).  Once a final deal is reached, it is considered a comprehensive conformation of 
varying national interests. 
 Although an international treaty represents the conforming of national interests 
and expectations among states, that does not guarantee that a treaty will be complied 
with, or complied with at all times.  International treaties are held to a standard of what is 
considered “acceptable” behavior under its guidelines, meaning that strict compliance is 
not always necessary in order for the treaty to remain relevant (Chayes and Chayes, 1993, 
176).  Certain factors may hamper a state’s ability to comply with a treaty, such as 1) 
ambiguity of treaty language, 2) state’s capacity limitations, and 3) social and economic 
changes that are outside the control of the treaty (Chayes and Chayes, 1993, 188; Downs, 
Rocke, and Barsoom, 1996, 380-381).  What determines whether a state is still within 
compliance of an international treaty is based upon what other parties to the treaty believe 
is acceptable (Chayes and Chayes, 1993, 202). 
 A state’s ability to comply with a treaty can be improved over time because a 
treaty may have certain mechanisms in place that may help induce a state’s overall 
compliance.  Some strategies that can be utilized to induce compliance include “(1) 
improving dispute resolution procedures, (2) technical and financial assistance, and (3) 
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increasing transparency” (Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom, 1996, 381).  The Law of the Sea 
in particular allows states to settle disputes through the International Tribunal for the Law 
of the Sea, a court generally viewed as impartial, fair, and legally binding on all the 
involved parties (Tzeng, 2016, 246).  However, these mechanisms may not guarantee that 
a party will continue to frequently renege on the agreement or disavow any legally-
binding mechanism to compel the party to comply with its treaty obligations. 
Enforcement of International Law 
 The next challenge that states face is how to enforce obligations under a treaty; 
the Law of the Sea and other treaties defining acceptable behavior at sea are no 
exceptions.  The enforcement of any international agreement falls within the scope of the 
Prisoners’ Dilemma, whereby one party may have incentive to renege in the short term 
while other parties may be in compliance with the treaty.  In the long run, agreements 
will work when parties are continuously playing this game until a favorable outcome is 
achieved (Fearon, 1998, 276-277).  One variable that determines the success of an 
agreement is the length of time the treaty is expected to remain in place.  For treaties with 
a long-term commitment, such as UNCLOS, states do not expect random shocks that 
undermine the strength of the agreement.  The ability to negotiate such an agreement in 
the first place is relatively low (Fearon, 1998, 294).  If noncompliance is the norm of a 
particular treaty arrangement, the problem may lie in the original design of the treaty, 
which inadequately addresses the issues it is meant to resolve (Chayes and Chayes, 1993, 
183; Fearon, 1998, 274).  If this is the case, it may be necessary for the parties to 
renegotiate the terms of the treaty or strengthen enforcement and compliance mechanisms 
to achieve a favorable outcome to all the involved parties. 
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 The research presented in this thesis will demonstrate the extent to which 
international law can be enforced.  Whenever an issue is considered a priority and vital to 
national interest, states will align with other likeminded powers to create regimes that can 
be used to effectively channel resources towards achieving a common purpose.  The 
regimes or institutions that states create as a result can be highly complex but highly 
effective at addressing vital state interests.  However, those issues that are lower priority, 
are often neglected.  Institutions or regimes that may exist to address these lower priority 
issues may not have the necessary resources to effectively tackle those problems.   
 Much of the research that focuses on enforcement issues within international 
institutions or organizations discuss how formal dispute resolution measures are an 
effective way to ensure compliance to international treaties and regime rules.  However, 
the case studies that will be presented later on in this thesis deal with institutions or 
agreements that do not possess formal dispute settlement resolutions.  Issues dealing with 
piracy are often through bilateral agreements that may authorize the use of force, while 
illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing has a number of institutions whose 
responsibilities overlap and requires states to enforce measures upon themselves.  I wish 
to provide new research on how enforcement can be achieved in these regimes in the 
absence of dispute settlement mechanisms and whether these agreements have an 
enforcement gap as a result of not having formal dispute settlement mechanisms.
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Chapter 3: The Rule of Law: The Political Incentive to Act, International and 
Domestic Law, and State Capacity 
 Effective maritime governance requires that certain criteria be met.  The first step 
of the process is whether states have the political will to contribute towards a particular 
regime.  States will conduct international relations based on their most important self-
interests; they create a hierarchy of these interests and conduct business based on what’s 
most practical within that time and space.  When states have aligned their interests they 
will contract with one another to create regimes or institutions, based on laws that will 
bind each other and enhance their mutual national interests.  International law is meant to 
limit state behavior, which can have the overall effect of enhancing state security, 
limiting the necessity for renewing contracts, and promoting stability in an international 
system that is characterized by its anarchic nature (Henkin, 1979, 29).  International law 
can have an array of characteristics that shape how it is implemented and enforced, such 
as whether treaties are bilateral or multilateral, or whether flexibility is allowed for 
convenience (Henkin, 1979, 30).   
 Institutions and regimes are usually created through international law which 
delegates how authority is distributed and reduces transaction costs across all the 
involved parties to ensure that commitments remain credible (Abbott and Snidal, 2009, 
21-22).  These institutions can be a construct of customary law and norms, also known as 
soft law, while others can be built around binding rules that are made to keep all parties 
within check.  Binding agreements between states provide stronger legal protections than 
those that are only non-binding.  Legally binding law also ensures that reneging on 
commitments is minimized and allows for better enforcement of state responsibilities 
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(Abbott and Snidal, 2009, 24).  This also increases the legitimacy of international law 
(Abbott and Snidal, 2009, 24).  Non-binding agreements can be diluted to a point where 
all parties disregard their obligations and cheat the system.  These are often described as 
free-rider problems, where one state shoulders the burden of maintaining the system, 
while other states do not take on any of risk. 
 Since these interests are of mutual importance, states agree to provide the 
necessary resources to resolve and secure them.  The resources that states contribute 
towards certain issues are measureable which can be monetary, labor, or technology 
related.  Binding agreements in international law come with high contracting costs, which 
are the costs a state must incur in order to implement the law (Abbott and Snidal, 2009, 
31).  Laws that delegate enforcement or dispute settlement authority limit state 
sovereignty in enforcing agreements, and is primarily the reason why some countries like 
the United States have not ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) (Abbott and Snidal, 2009, 33-34).  Regimes have the power to enhance 
cooperation among states, primarily be providing and sharing information with each 
other, they can better coordinate their efforts. 
The second step is to establish jurisdiction for violations and crimes that take 
place in international waters.  UNCLOS establishes state territorial waters that lie within 
12 nautical miles of a nation’s coastline.  Within territorial waters, the state has the ability 
to enforce its domestic laws under its national jurisdiction (Oxman, 2009, 405).  Under 
UNCLOS, states also have the ability to claim 200 nautical miles from their coast as an 
exclusive economic zone (EEZ).  Within an EEZ, the state has the power to exploit 
resources and restrict access to other states who also wish to extract resources (Oxman, 
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2009, 405).  This means that beyond 200 nautical miles from a nation’s shoreline, and 
outside of the EEZ, is considered international waters, and states are obligated by 
conventional norms and customary law to protect the freedom of navigation.  This 
implies that whatever takes place in international waters is generally beyond a state’s 
sovereign territory, and therefore, beyond that state’s traditional jurisdiction, unless that 
infraction incurred within a state’s EEZ. 
The idea behind UNCLOS was to prevent any one state from establishing 
hegemony over the oceans and it has been abided by even among those states with 
powerful navies, including those states that have not ratified the treaty (Henkin, 1979, 
35).  States are given certain rights to be able to deploy enforcement resources wherever 
needed to protect their national interests on the seas (Oxman, 2009, 408).  A ship sailing 
in the seas will fly a national flag, which identifies which state has the jurisdiction over 
that ship; this state is known as the flag state and is responsible for enforcing its national 
laws over that ship (Oxman, 2009, 410).  This has allowed states to have the ability to 
enforce laws upon those individuals who may be involved in criminal activity by 
establishing state jurisdiction (Henkin, 1979, 35).  Under UNCLOS, states are given the 
responsibilities to manage resources responsibly and protect the environment, which 
includes issues such as fisheries management (Oxman, 2009, 412-413).  These 
responsibilities include issuing fishing licenses to foreign vessels and setting total 
allowable catch limits (Oxman, 2009, 412-413).  The law also provides for delegating to 
states which ships have access to ports and markets, these states are called port states 
(Oxman, 2009, 410).   
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In order to successfully prosecute violations or crimes in international waters, 
states must make agreements that establish jurisdiction in areas beyond a state’s territory, 
such as establishing universal jurisdiction, or making commitments to impose jurisdiction 
onto individuals entering within its territorial waters.  Establishing jurisdiction under the 
law is necessary to provide states with the authority to prosecute criminals and other 
transgressors in formal courts.  International law will determine which states or 
institutions that have the responsibility and the capacity to establish jurisdiction in order 
to best coordinate their efforts.   States have the ability to either incorporate international 
law within its domestic framework in order to prosecute violators in national courts, or 
they can delegate that authority to international tribunals (Higgins, 2010, 205).  States 
that lack the capacity to try criminals in national courts can defer to alternative measures 
in order to ensure justice against unlawful acts.  In other words, states may make 
arrangements to prosecute criminals in another state’s court system. 
Since enforcement in cases like piracy and IUU fishing are collective action 
problems, states must determine where to try criminals.  Without the ability to declare 
jurisdiction, states do not have the rights or necessarily the means to prosecute those 
individuals who are responsible for crimes and other violations in international waters, 
which allows for noncompliance with international agreements to continue.  States will 
generally not ratify international agreements with which they do not intend to comply.  
Treaties themselves allow states to make minor adjustments to their national policies in 
order to better enforce compliance (Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom, 1996, 380; Simmons 
and Hopkins, 2005, 624).  States are more willing to comply with international law if the 
law has the following measures:  “(1) improving dispute resolution procedures, (2) 
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technical and financial assistance, and (3) increasing transparency” (Downs, Rocke, and 
Barsoom, 1996, 381).  Noncompliance to a treaty can have great costs to a state, therefore 
a state would be more reluctant to join a treaty if they anticipate noncompliance at a 
future point (Simmons and Hopkins, 2005, 624).   
The third necessary criterion is to have strong domestic institutions that that can 
effectively impose the rule of law.  This means that states must possess the court and 
penal systems and laws necessary to effectively prosecute transgressors for crimes and/or 
violations that take place on the high seas.  Strong institutions themselves can act as a 
deterrent to violators for fear that they may be imprisoned or severely fined for illegal 
activity.  Establishing effective penalties such as prison sentences, can be effective in 
preventing criminal activity.  The research presented later in this thesis will demonstrate 
that states with capable domestic institutions can effectively mitigate illegitimate 
behavior and strengthen the international community’s ability to seek progress on 
collective action. 
Weak institutions do not have the ability to exact punishment on violators; 
therefore, illegal activity would continue to persist, despite the law.  Criminals have the 
natural tendency to exploit weaknesses in state and international enforcement to further 
their interests and pose the greatest challenge to international governance (Williams, 
2002, 106).  This has the effect of interrupting trade flows and unsustainable practices 
related to resource extraction.  Weak domestic institutions also present compliance 
problems.  If a state cannot effectively prosecute bad actors it cannot achieve compliance 
under the law, therefore undermining the whole treaty regime.  Weak capacity allows 
criminal behavior to thrive.  The increasingly global economy also allows criminals to 
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hide assets and move finances quickly and provides them with the ability to penetrate 
state institutions in order to erode the enforcement capacity that would be needed to 
neutralize their behavior (Williams, 2002, 106-107).   
And lastly, the final requirement is the ability of states to project power and the 
political will to use it.  Power is not only the ability to pressure states to do something 
they would not have ordinarily done, but also the capacity to contribute to resolving 
collective action problems.  States actively use whatever power and resources available to 
them to protect their national interests, and they will use these to protect themselves from 
states as well as non-state actors (Barnett and Duvall, 2005, 40).  In other words, 
governance along the high seas requires a formidable navy to not only protect sovereign 
territory, but also to be deployed to ensure the freedom of navigation.  Some countries 
with a strong navy, such as the United States use their capabilities to pressure states to 
accept their interests (Barnett and Duvall, 2005, 41). 
This ability to project power is only possessed by a few states, however, states all 
have a vested interest in maintaining global trade flows to continue and to remain 
uninterrupted.  The ability to project force, or the threat to use force, in international 
waters acts as a deterrent to those who would inhibit the rights of people to move freely.  
States that do not possess this power to enforce laws effectively severely hamper 
international efforts to combat transnational crimes.  These states even provide some 
level of sanctuary to criminals as a result of their inability to enact law enforcement 
(Williams, 2002, 140).  However, this can be prevented if states work with one another to 
build capacity to better monitor what occurs within their national jurisdictions (Williams, 
2002, 142). 
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The enforcement part of this regime also includes ways in which states punish 
criminals and violators.  For example, this includes if states can extract fines for 
unsustainable fishing practices or if they can incarcerate pirates.  This capacity acts as a 
deterrent for future behavior; individuals who would normally have contributed to the 
problem now have legitimate fear that their activities can lead to arrest, economic loss, or 
incarceration.  The EEZs established under UNCLOS have allowed for better resource 
management and enforcement of fisheries.  Prior to UNCLOS, the state neither had the 
political will nor the authority to punish fishermen for over fishing (Downs, Rocke, and 
Barsoom, 1996, 395).  By establishing the 200 nautical mile of jurisdiction over the seas, 
states were given increased capacity to enforce the rule of law and the management of 
resources (Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom, 1996, 395).   
An effective maritime governance regime requires that all four criteria are present.  
Without the collective political will, states cannot reach an agreement to address any 
international issue.  Legally binding agreements tend to allow states to affirm and 
challenge each other’s commitments towards reaching their shared goals.  States must 
also fuse international agreements and obligations into domestic policy objectives and 
laws, otherwise they lack the resources necessary to uphold international agreements.  
Finally, states must possess and apply imposition resources effectively, to enforce the 
rule of law within their own territories and wherever their strongest national interests 
arise.
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Chapter 4: Piracy as a Case Study 
 Maritime piracy and armed robbery at sea have been issues since the beginning of 
recorded history.  New technology and methods have transformed this criminal act over 
time, making it much more sophisticated and lucrative than ever before.  In a globalized 
world where goods are constantly traversing the oceans, piracy has the capacity to 
severely disrupt trade, increase prices for consumer goods, and fund terrorist 
organizations.  In the golden age of piracy in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, 
pirates often targeted merchant ships within strategic waterways to plunder cargo.  
Today’s maritime piracy has followed this trend, but has also incorporated ransom 
hijacking of cargo ships as a tactic and then ransoming the crew and the ships for 
enormous sums of money (Levin, 2015, 261-262).  What has complicated matters in the 
modern age is the ownership.  The East India Trading Company for example previously 
had full ownership of their ships, crew, and cargo (Levin, 2015, 263; Youngs, 2014, 820-
821).  Today however, the ships, cargo, and crew are all from different countries, making 
matters much more complex in terms of jurisdiction and more international by nature 
(Levin, 2015, 263; Youngs, 2014, 820-821).  For the purposes of this thesis, instances of 
piracy and armed robbery at sea will be called piracy, unless otherwise noted.  The 
International Maritime Bureau (IMB) defines piracy as “an act of boarding or attempting 
to board any ship with the apparent intent to commit theft or any other crime and with the 
apparent intent or capability to use force in the furtherance of that act” (Onuoha, 2013, 
274).   
Nature of Maritime Piracy: Causes and Effects 
 The recent scourge of piracy and armed robbery at sea began in the 1990s with 
the end of the Cold War.  This was a result of political and economic instability in the 
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developing world and the decrease of strong naval presences along important trading 
routes (Yurika, 2014, 336).  By 2000, piracy has been predominant in three areas of the 
world: the Somalian Coast, the Gulf of Guinea, and the Strait of Malacca.  In each case 
the causes and nature of piracy are different which presents individual challenges for the 
international community to consider.  Piracy and armed robbery at sea can be considered 
rational criminal actions if the likelihood of arrest and prosecution remain low.  And if 
the government is unable to crackdown on criminal activities, the chances that piracy 
occurs only increases, becoming an international threat (Daxecker and Prins, 2015, 701).  
Geography also plays an important factor.  Inlet waterways and long coast lines provide 
safe haven for many pirate groups and make it difficult for policing (Daxecker, and Prins, 
2015, 701).  Aside from the lack of enforcement capabilities, piracy is fostered through 
specific narratives of economic and cultural marginalization, where communities operate 
in a more informal economy based on clan ties and are mostly left out of the more 
“legitimate” formal economy and therefore are not prospering in a globalized market 
(Hastings and Phillips, 2015, 556).  This narrative often includes feelings of injustice, 
where more powerful actors are responsible for maintaining a system were poorer 
communities continue to be marginalized, a sense that only pirates can protect the 
community from outside threats, a de facto coast guard, and strong feelings of 
nationalism and the desire to regain control of one’s territory (Hastings and Phillips, 
2015, 564).  Additionally, sovereignty prevents navies from pursuing pirates within the 
jurisdiction of another state and allows them to evade capture and organize future attacks 
(Daxecker and Prins, 2015, 701-702). 
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Piracy originating from Somalia’s coast began around 2005; these attacks were 
primarily focused in the waterways of the Red Sea, the Arabian Sea, and the Indian 
Ocean (Affi et al, 2016, 934).  The threat of piracy from Somalia had major global 
implications.  Around 40% of global trade goes around the Horn of Africa; and, in 2011 
alone, piracy cost the global economy around $6.6-6.9 billion with major liabilities paid 
by the shipping industry (Youngs, 2014, 810).  Overall, the costs to ship goods through 
this part of the world cost the global economy an additional $18 billion (Youngs, 2014, 
810).   Insurance premiums for cargo ships traversing through the waters around Somalia 
have cost the shipping industry an additional $423 million to $437 million in 2012 
(Onuoha, 2013, 286).  Somali piracy is characterized by the highjacking and ransom of 
cargo vessels and their crew (Hastings and Phillips, 2015, 558).  Pirates operating off the 
coast of Somalia use a team of small ships led by a mother ship as a command-and-
control center.  Pirates have access to modern technology such as GPS, and are financed 
by powerful warlords who have turned ransom into a profitable enterprise (Hodgkinson, 
2013, 148).  At its peak in 2011, Somalia’s piracy operations included a handful of 
financiers distributing money to approximately 50 main pirate leaders who led 300 attack 
groups comprising of about 2,000 foot soldiers (Hodgkinson, 2013, 148).  Their 
operations were successful enough to cause $25 billion worth of damages and ransoms 
greatly fed these criminal organizations (Hodgkinson, 2013, 148).  Somalia has weak 
domestic and economic institutions that have allowed this form piracy to thrive.  Those 
who highjack cargo ships are not necessarily interested in selling the goods they capture.  
But, the lack of enforcement by Somali officials and the lack of proper infrastructure 
allow for the sell pirated goods.  In most cases, pirates to seize ships and hold them 
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hostage for long periods of time awaiting ransom payments (Hastings and Phillips, 2015, 
558).  Hostage negotiations are often carried out on the ship that was seized (Hastings 
and Phillips, 2015, 562-563).  Somalia’s pirates have demonstrated highly sophisticated 
logistical support for ransom negotiations, using payments as a constant source for 
funding future operations which is emblematic of a highly organized criminal enterprise.  
Negotiators use cell phones to liaise between pirate bosses and ship owners and possess 
foreign language skills that allow them to effectively negotiate payments (Youngs, 2014, 
811-812).  In 2011, thirty-one ransom payments totaling close to $160 million, with an 
average payment of nearly $5 million, were paid by ship owners to pirate groups and 
payments were used to purchase arms and facilitate future attacks (Youngs, 2014, 812; 
Onuoha, 2013, 284).  Ransoms are believed to finance extremist groups, particularly Al-
Shabaab in their war with the United States and the internationally-recognized Somali 
government (Beekarry, 2013, 163).  As a result of piracy off Somalia’s coast, aid 
deliveries to the region have been riskier and more costly (Beekarry, 2013, 163). 
 In recent years, the Gulf of Guinea in Western Africa has increasingly become a 
hotbed of piracy.  Piracy in this region is of a vastly different nature than piracy in the 
Horn of Africa.  In contrast to Somalia, piracy in this part of the world does not generally 
take place in international waters, but within territorial waters of the states in that region.  
Although these acts technically constitute “armed robbery at sea” as opposed to “piracy” 
under international law, they still pose a threat to global shipping and have many of the 
same underlying causes as piracy that takes place in international waters (Kamal-Deen, 
2015, 94).  The western coast of Africa produces about 70% of the continent’s oil 
production and includes a number of countries including: Angola, Benin, Cameroon, 
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Central African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), 
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Nigeria, 
Republic of Congo, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo.  Mineral 
resources and large fishery reserves are also threatened as a result of piracy in the region 
(Onuoha, 2013, 269).  However, oil and mineral wealth have rarely translated into 
economic gain for populations within those countries, many of which deal with 
socioeconomic problems as a result of corruption and lack of good governance, often 
leading to political instability (Otto, 2014, 316).  Nigeria has been at the center of this 
conflict, accounting for about 80% of all piracy-related cases (Kamal-Deen, 2015, 97).  A 
number of armed militant groups, collectively known as The Movement for the 
Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), have emerged demanding a greater share of 
the oil profits from the Nigerian government and oil producers (Onuoha, 2013, 268; 
Kamal-Deen, 2015, 97; Otto, 2014, 318).  Pirates in the Gulf of Guinea have adopted 
similar methods to their Somali counterparts, including the use of the mother-ship 
whereby pirates use this ship as the command-and-control center and use smaller vessels 
as a means to get close to cargo ships (Kamal-Deen, 2015, 101).  However, instead of 
holding ships or crew for ransom, these pirate groups specifically target vessels with 
refined oil.  The oil they steal is sold illegally throughout the region (Hodgkinson, 2013, 
149; Kamal-Deen, 2015, 101).  Piracy in the Delta region has been allowed to thrive due 
to lack of effective domestic governance.  Countries in this region lack the institutions to 
alleviate poverty and lack the enforcement capabilities to protect their coasts and internal 
waters from pirate attacks (Kamal-Deen, 2015, 106).  In Nigeria in particular, high levels 
of corruption and ongoing conflict with armed extremist groups in the region has 
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exacerbated the threat of piracy throughout the Delta region (Onuoha, 2013, 271; Otto, 
2014, 314).  This has allowed pirates to extend their attacks beyond territorial waters and 
become an international problem with an increasing number of attacks taking place in 
international waters (Otto, 2014, 314; Kamal-Deen, 2015, 104).  Additionally, the 
international effort to combat piracy in this part of the world has been limited due to the 
territorial nature of piracy in the Delta region.  International law, which will be discussed 
in further detail later on, states that action against piracy must take place outside of 
territorial waters (Otto, 2014, 314).  Most attacks occur within the 12-mile territorial 
boundary outlined in UNCLOS (Onuoha, 2013, 273). 
The Strait of Malacca is the third region with some of the highest levels of piracy 
throughout the world.  This is a crucial waterway, that runs between Indonesia to the west 
and Malaysia and Singapore to the East, and roughly one-third of all cargo ships travel 
through this narrow passage as a means to transport goods between East Asia and Europe 
and the Middle East (McGahan and Lee, 2015, 532).  Around 60,000 ships traverse the 
Strait of Malacca annually, constituting about 30% of all global trade and 50% of oil 
supplies.  Piracy in this area threatens to slow down trade throughout the region and can 
potentially damage the environment if an oil tanker is damaged as a result (Baird, 2012, 
502).  This waterway is crucial for energy imports to East Asia through which 90% of 
Japan’s energy imports and 70-80% of China’s energy imports traverse (McGahan and 
Lee, 2015, 532).  Piracy around the Strait has resulted from poverty, particularly after the 
1997 Asian financial crisis.   Many people in this area rely on fishing as a source of 
income and have been mostly left out of the economic gains that Southeast Asia has 
experienced since the 1997 financial crisis.  Many of these populations see piracy as a 
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means to make quick money with relatively low risk (Baird, 2012, 504).  Pirates in the 
region had been known to board ships at night and grab whatever loose goods that they 
could find; however, this has shifted to a more Somali-style attack where pirates hold 
vessels and crew for ransom (Baird, 2012, 505).   
International Law: International Action and Universal Jurisdiction 
 The international law concerning piracy began as international customary law, or 
law that is unwritten but widely acknowledged as normal state behavior.  International 
law and prosecution of pirates can be credited to Hugo Grotius, who defined piracy as 
hostis humanis generis, meaning that piracy is a crime against all of humanity (Beekarry, 
2013, 162; Youngs, 2014, 820).   The legal theory behind Grotius’ argument is that 
commerce and, by extension, trade are necessary for the preservation of humankind and 
all individuals can exercise these rights; thus, no nation can prohibit trade or access to 
markets nor are they capable of claiming jurisdiction of the high seas (Garrod, 2014, 
203).   Under Grotius’ argument, the freedom to navigate and trade is a human right 
therefore piracy, which wishes to harm that right, is an egregious act that all nations are 
responsible to suppress (Grotius, 2014, 38).  As a result, all nations were given the 
jurisdiction to protect the freedom of navigation and trade on the high seas, using force 
when necessary to protect important trade routes from criminals as well as other states 
(Garrod, 2014, 207).  This legal framework defined the “golden age of piracy” as the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
 Among some of the issues that make combating piracy a challenge is the way it is 
defined in international law.  The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS), within Articles 101-107, defines piracy as “(1) an act of violence, detention 
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or depredation; (2) on the high seas; (3) committed for private ends; and (4) by the crew 
or passengers of one private vessel against those of another vessel” (Beekarry, 2013, 162; 
Affi et al, 2016, 934).  As a result of piracy off the coast of Somalia, the United Nations 
Security Council invoked Chapter VII of the UN Charter which obligated states to use 
whatever resources necessary to suppress piracy in the waters around Somalia, including 
the use of force (Affi et al, 2016, 934).  The international community implemented a 
multi-pronged strategy that effectively suppressed piracy around Somalia.  Under UN 
Security Council Resolution 1851, the Council authorized the use of force against pirates 
within Somali territory (Obert, 2014, 205).  Part of this strategy involved the elimination 
of pirate safe havens within Somalia such as the 2012 raid of a pirate safe haven in 
Haradheere conducted by the European Union Naval Forces (EUNAVFOR).  The raid 
destroyed many of the skiffs that the pirates had used to hijack cargo ships (Obert, 2014, 
198; Hodgkinson, 2013, 150).  By attacking pirates’ onshore command centers, 
EUNAVFOR was able to damage pirate logistics and the ability to sustain their attack 
operations (Obert, 2014, 202-203).  EUNAVFOR was given further legal authorization to 
suppress piracy on Somalia’s coast as a result of the Somali government’s consent to the 
use of force on its land (Obert, 2014, 203-204).  As a sovereign state, Somalia ultimately 
grants the final authority on whether the international community (NATO and 
EUNAVFOR) can conduct independent military operations within its borders (Obert, 
2014, 210; Hodgkinson, 2013, 151). 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) also increased naval patrols 
around Somalia called Operation Allied Provider to escort World Food Program vessels, 
which was later followed by Operation Allied Protector and Operation Allied Shield 
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which made a significant impact on curbing piracy around Somalia (Hodgkinson, 2013, 
150).  The naval patrols operating in the waters around the Horn of Africa have 
established a comprehensive rule of engagement that allows them to “board vessels, 
arrest and detain persons suspected of taking part in piracy, and use force to stop a pirate 
vessel or intervene in a hijacking “(Blank, 2013, 406).  Enhanced cooperation among 
these navies has produced better enforcement capacity in Somalia’s waters (Blank, 2013, 
406).  The international community also coordinated efforts to establish the cargo 
industry’s best management practices (BMPs) which included registration and reporting 
to regional organizations such as the EU and practices for protecting ships (Madsen and 
Kane Hartnett, 2014, 69).   The coalition group working around the Horn of Africa was 
known as the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS).   The group 
coordinated antipiracy measures among all stakeholders in the region, including the 
Somali government, European naval patrols, maritime regulatory agencies, and the 
shipping industry (Madsen and Hartnett, 2014, 68).  This later developed into the 
Djibouti Code of Conduct, which is a nonbinding group of stakeholders interested in 
combatting piracy.  Its code addresses issues such as the arrest and prosecution of pirates, 
investigation, rescue of hostages and ships, and coordination among naval patrols and 
national governments to evaluate antipiracy laws (Madsen and Kane-Hartnett, 2014, 71-
72).   
A similar framework has developed in the Strait of Malacca between Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and Singapore, but has had limited success in combatting piracy.  In 2004, 
these three countries formed a naval patrol task force called MALSINDO (incorporating 
the names of the three states) which later became the Malacca Strait Patrols, and 
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incorporated a mechanism which allowed for some “hot pursuit” rights, which allowed 
for states to pursue pirates in another state’s jurisdiction (McGahan and Lee, 2015, 530).  
Indonesia is an archipelago state comprised of 17,000 islands which would require it to 
spend extraordinary amounts of money to patrol its waters.  Therefore, this regime also 
allows the parties involved to share the costs and capabilities (McGahan and Lee, 2015, 
534).  As members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), they insist 
that sovereignty and non-interference in domestic policies must remain the core 
principles of this anti-piracy campaign (McGahan and Lee, 2015, 540). 
The makeup of the anti-piracy regime in Southeast Asia can be classified as norm 
subsidiary, whereby weaker states band together to protect their autonomy from more 
powerful actors, particularly the Western powers, and regulate the rules and 
responsibilities among themselves.  This is developed as a means to protect themselves 
from outside influences emanating from more dominant actors that might exploit the 
vulnerabilities of weaker individual states (McGahan and Lee, 2015, 536-537).  
However, the efforts of this regime have not resulted in any significant decrease in 
piracy-related incidents in the Strait of Malacca.  In recent years, however, these 
countries have worked with other regional partners, including China, to increase naval 
patrols in international waters (Manjiao, 2013, 115).  As a major global market power, 
China is highly vulnerable to piracy issues, which harms its ability to conduct trade 
(Manjiao, 2013, 113).  Although China is involved through its obligations through the 
2006 Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combatting Piracy and Armed Robbery 
Against Ships (ReCAPP), which has enhanced regional cooperation (Manjiao, 2013, 
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114), it still lacks the domestic laws necessary to prosecute pirates effectively (Manjiao, 
2013, 117-118). 
Weaknesses related to an international response can also be seen in the Gulf of 
Guinea, where the UN Security Council has not directed any resolutions towards the 
matter and has resulted in “catch and release” policies, where captured pirates are sent 
back to their country of origin (Kamal-Deen, 2015, 108).  These pirates are unlikely to 
face prosecution or serve prison sentences upon their return (Kamal-Deen, 2015, 108).  
The United States and European Union have directed resources towards the area to 
combat piracy, but their operations are limited to incidents in international waters 
(Kamal-Deen, 2015, 109).  The states along the Gulf of Guinea have formed a group 
called the Maritime Organization of West and Central Africa (MOWA), which also has 
support from non-littoral states, but it has not fully implemented any concrete programs 
to mitigate the piracy epidemic in the region (Otto, 2014, 323).  It is important to note 
that many piracy-related incidents in the Gulf of Guinea take place within territorial 
waters and are therefore not subject to the jurisdiction of another state’s courts. 
A second tactic that helped to deter pirates in Somalia was the employment of 
private maritime security companies (PMSCs) to protect cargo vessels traveling through 
the area; the justification being that cargo ships from the United States and United 
Kingdom that have had PMSCs aboard have not been hijacked by pirates and the practice 
has been highly encouraged throughout the shipping industry (Affi et al, 2016, 934).  The 
responsibilities of PMSCs are two-fold; first, PMSCs are tasked with protecting cargo 
ships around the Horn of Africa by preventing hijackings and pirate attacks (Affi et al, 
2016, 935).  The second task involved working with the Somali government to protect its 
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coastal waters from illegal activities including cracking down on illegal fishing and 
training the Somali Coast Guard (Affi et al, 2016, 935).  The hiring of PMSCs has had 
some drawbacks.  PMSCs can pose challenges to human rights since PMSCs operate 
outside the jurisdiction of international law.  The freedom of navigation can be disrupted 
if a PMSC does allow commercial ships to pass through areas freely, and they can 
produce confusion over the chain of command of a ship (Affi et al, 2016, 935).  PMSCs 
found to be violating international law are often not held accountable (Affi et al, 2016, 
940).  There have been many problems with PMSCs operating within Somalia that have 
resulted in high turnover (Affi et al, 2016, 937).  The issues resulted from funding issues, 
profit sharing, and changes in Somali leadership (Affi et al, 2016, 937).  Another issue 
with hiring PMSCs is their cost on the shipping industry.  A shipping company will hire a 
team of four guards to protect a ship travelling through a high-risk area that can cost 
about $45,000 per trip and has driven up insurance costs throughout the industry 
(Hodgkinson, 2013, 153).  In 2012, 25%-40% of cargo ships travelling around the Horn 
of Africa had armed security personnel aboard at an additional cost of $1.1 to $1.5 billion 
(Affi et al, 2016, 937). 
A third approach that the international community took to combat piracy off the 
coast of Somalia was to organize regional prosecution networks, where  pirates captured 
in international waters can be brought to a criminal court in another country with a 
stronger rule of law in order to prosecute them for piracy.  These networks have largely 
been incredibly effective in seeing that criminals go through a formal court and serve jail 
time.  It has also been responsible for deterring piracy around Somalia.  These networks 
were a two-step process.  First, a state that had captured pirates at sea would make a 
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formal agreement with another state to transfer detainees to face a court that was willing 
to prosecute pirates (Beekarry, 2013, 168).  Second, another transfer agreement would be 
established to move those convicted of piracy to serve sentences in a state that was 
willing to hold them (Beekarry, 2013, 168).  This second agreement was necessary 
because many of the states that prosecuted pirates often lacked the capacity to detain 
prisoners or were overburdened with the number of criminals they were prosecuting 
(Beekarry, 2013, 168).  For example, the regional governments within Somalia 
established formal agreements with the Seychelles and Mauritius in 2011 and 2012 
respectively; both countries would prosecute pirates in their courts, but had limited 
capacity to detain prisoners, and agreed to transfer prisoners back to Somalia to serve 
their sentences as long as the treatment of prisoners was respected and complied with 
international human rights law (Beekarry, 2013, 169-170).  These legal regimes have 
resulted in the prosecution and sentencing of over 1,000 pirates, who are now serving 
time in 20 countries (Youngs, 2014, 811).   
State Capacity and Effective Domestic Institutions 
The idea that all nations have a responsibility to prosecute crimes that occur 
outside the territorial jurisdictions of any state is the principle behind universal 
jurisdiction.  UNCLOS provides states with the ability to declare universal jurisdiction to 
try pirates and suppress their activity through prosecution and cooperation with other 
states (Beekarry, 2013, 164-165).  Particularly in the case of Somali piracy, universal 
jurisdiction was used as the basis to prosecute pirates outside of their native countries for 
crimes in international waters.  The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea is difficult to 
implement due to its limits on jurisdiction (Otto, 2014, 315).  Under UNCLOS, states are 
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first responsible for suppressing piracy within their territories, and secondly, states are 
obligated to work with other states at the regional and international level through 
information sharing and joint patrols (Kamal-Deen, 2015, 108).  Obviously there are 
parts of the world which lack such structures, which has allowed piracy to become more 
prominent.  There are only a handful of agreements that allow for ship-riding, pursuit, 
boarding, and capture within territorial waters.  There is no centralized court that can 
process piracy cases, and jurisdiction between sovereign states and regional bodies often 
lack the clear definitions or rules to process cases of piracy.  There is also a lack of 
political will among governments and the shipping industry on best practices and costs 
(Otto, 2014, 315-316).  But, if a naval vessel is attacked by pirates, the ship that has been 
attacked can use force to defend itself as a right under international law (Obert, 2014, 
211).  
In practice, the prosecution of pirates falls within the umbrella of state 
jurisdiction.  UNCLOS does not obligate states to prosecute pirates for their crimes, but 
the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation (SUA Convention) does require that states take the necessary steps to 
prosecute pirates (Kiss, 2015, 362).  Piracy is not considered to be an international crime, 
but treated as a violation of international law, thus states exercise their municipal laws to 
prosecute pirates which have varying levels of effectiveness (Kiss, 2015, 363).  The 
number of laws and the divergent definitions that exist within the antipiracy regime have 
created a legal structure that is difficult for states to navigate the rules, the hierarchy of 
certain laws is confusing as well as how to make enforcement legitimate without 
violating the law.  There is also the costs to implement international agreements (Struett, 
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2013, 95).  In many cases, judges have not faced any piracy trials and national laws 
regarding piracy vary from state to state, lacking the uniformity that may be necessary to 
enhance the ability to prosecute pirates (Kiss, 2015, 361).  Many states have often relied 
on establishing normal jurisdiction, thus only a handful of states have successfully 
prosecuted pirates (Beekarry, 2013, 164-165).  In combatting Somali piracy, as stated, 
many other states have taken up the burden of prosecuting piracy, either by declaring 
universal jurisdiction or trying pirates under their domestic laws (Hodgkinson, 2013, 
153).  These countries have also worked with the UN Office of Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC) to increase capacity by training judges, offering legal assistance, mitigate 
issues of overcrowded prisons, and training prison personnel (Hodgkinson, 2013, 153-
154).   However, international action against piracy has not been perfect.  In many cases, 
pirates that are captured are not effectively prosecuted and are often released (Knorr, 
2015, 672).  Patrolling international waters is also very costly for those states that 
contribute resources (Knorr, 2015 672).  Additionally, many acts that may be considered 
piracy now take place within territorial waters, like the case of piracy in the Niger River 
Delta region.  These instances are defined as “armed robbery” and jurisdiction falls onto 
the state in which the infraction occurred (Affi et al, 2016, 934). 
 Ultimately, tackling the domestic causes, such as poverty, that lead to piracy is the 
only way to curb these crimes.  In 2012, UNODC worked with officials in Somalia to 
promote an awareness campaign to change public opinion on piracy (Gilmer, 2016, 765).   
Awareness campaigns are a form of onshore counter-piracy measures aimed at deterring 
individuals from engaging in piracy-related activities (Gilmer, 2016, 766).  The campaign 
targeted individuals who were considered potential recruits (Gilmer, 2016, 773).  The 
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awareness campaign focused on increasing the perceived risk of engaging in piracy and 
encouraged public dialogue that allowed the Somali people to engage those within their 
own communities about the dangers of becoming involved in piracy (Gilmer, 2016, 775).  
Religious leaders became involved in the anti-piracy message, labeling such activity as 
“haram” under Islamic law (Gilmer, 2016, 776).  Shopkeepers also assisted by refusing to 
accept cash from known pirates, making it difficult for pirates to spend money within 
their local communities (Gilmer, 2016, 776).  The most prominent example of anti-piracy 
campaigns took place in the city of Eyl, in the Puntland region of Somalia.  The 
campaign was successful due to input from the local community; the city has shown a 
higher level of governance compared to the rest of Somalia as a result of the anti-piracy 
campaign (Madsen and Kane-Hartnett, 2014, 75). 
 States must also have the capacity to project power over their territorial waters.  
This means, states must have the naval capability to deter attacks on their shores.  For 
example, the Gulf of Guinea states do not have the capacity to procure a large enough 
navy or coast guard to protect their shores, which has allowed piracy to thrive in the 
region (Onuoha, 2013, 285).  States in a cooperative agreement have not established rules 
for a ship-rider capability which would allow police forces of one state to assist in 
investigating pirate attacks within another state (Yurika, 2014, 341).  And it was not until 
recently that Somalia’s neighbors have developed their own coast guards that can conduct 
their own investigative work.  The lack of financial resources throughout the region 
means that antipiracy initiatives are costly and makes policies difficult to implement 
(Yurika, 2014, 342).  Pirates generally understand the limits of government enforcement 
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and the limits of its jurisdiction, and they tend to exploit these weaknesses to their benefit 
(Daxecker and Prins, 2015, 700). 
 Improving governance on land is seen as the most important step towards 
combatting piracy.  By increasing the state’s capacity to tackle the conditions that often 
lead to piracy, the harder it becomes for pirate groups to establish a base of operation 
(Levin, 2015, 265). One way to increase state capacity is to target government corruption.  
Government corruption allows pirate groups and other criminal enterprises to access 
information and infrastructure which can be used to carry out attacks.  Corruption also 
allows pirates to use the formal economy as the mechanism to facilitate attacks (Hastings 
and Phillips, 2015, 571).  In Nigeria’s case, political and business elites own the oil 
production networks in the Niger Delta and regulate the oil traded from their country 
(Hastings and Phillips, 2015, 573).   Government corruption has emboldened pirates to 
carry out attacks without fear of detention or prosecution under the law.  Nigeria’s oil 
wealth has not been properly distributed throughout the country, which has made 
economic conditions in many communities dire.  In addition, politicians serve the for-
profit oil industry which has led to a cycle of poverty and a deterioration of the rule of 
law (Otto, 2014, 320). 
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Chapter 5: Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing (IUU Fishing) as a Case 
Study 
 Over fishing of our ocean’s fisheries is a growing concern among the international 
community due to its impact on food security, biodiversity of the oceans, and the 
economic impacts on those who rely on this trade for their livelihood.  Illegal, 
unreported, and unregulated fishing (IUU fishing) in particular has had a significant 
impact on states’ ability to sustain the ocean’s major fisheries and ensure that people can 
continue to rely on our oceans for a source of food and economic development.  Illegal 
fishing refers to fishing by vessels that operate outside the laws of fisheries.  These 
vessels may be operating without proper licenses or may be using equipment that is not 
allowed (Liddick, 2014, 292).  Unreported fishing refers to fish caught but not reported or 
misreported to the governing authority of a fishery (Liddick, 2014, 292).  Unregulated 
fishing refers to vessels operating in a fishery where the vessels are either not flying a 
national flag or flying a nation’s flag that is not a party to the regional governing body, or 
it could refer to vessels operating outside the conservation or management resources 
(Liddick, 2014, 292). 
Scope of IUU Fishing and its Impact on Fishery Sustainability 
 The global population has grown considerably over the last few decades, and with 
it, a higher demand for food and a heightened emphasis on food security.  The increase in 
food has also affected the market for fish, which is considered a healthy source of 
protein, but it has also had a damaging effect on the sustainability of fish stocks (Riddle, 
2006, 265).  By 2006, one out of ten of the world’s fish stocks have been exploited to 
unsustainable levels and the international community has been slow to respond (Riddle, 
2006, 265-266).  As any other finite resource, the maintenance of fish stocks is a 
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collective action problem that is susceptible to free-riders, or actors that take advantage of 
a common pool resource without suffering the costs that other actors face in the system 
(Telesetsky, 2014, 941).  As the supply of fish decreases, due to increased demand and 
overfishing, the prices for those fish has increased, and is likely to further increase as the 
world’s fish stocks are further depleted.  Essentially, the greater price also increases the 
demand to fish for a high value species (Riddle, 2006, 268-269).  IUU fishing has played 
a major contributing factor to the unsustainability of the world’s fish stocks.  IUU fishing 
is primarily driven by the expected economic benefits, which can be highly lucrative, and 
the perceived lack of punishment for engaging in such activity (Schmidt, 2005, 482).  
IUU fishing includes practices such as fishing without proper permits, noncompliance to 
fishery rules, catching prohibited species, catching beyond the allowable quota, and use 
of improper gear (Riddle, 2006, 266).  Approximately 15-30% of the fish sold on the 
market, about 11-26 million tons, is caught through IUU related activities (Liddick, 2014, 
291-292; Kao, 2015, 3). This has resulted in not only a major loss to the world’s fish 
stocks, but has led to the near collapse of certain stocks, and a has become an economic 
drain on those who fish legally and rely on fishing to make a living, severely 
undermining the legal fishing industry (Schmidt, 2005, 481).  Coastal populations that 
rely heavily on the fishing industry face an annual loss of $11-$23.5 billion annually 
(Liddick, 2014, 292).  The global nature of IUU fishing means that depletion of fish 
stocks from one part of the world can increase food insecurity in other parts of the world 
that import fish and threatens the global food supply (Tsamenyi, 2010, 7). 
Only recently has IUU fishing turned from a resource management problem to a 
criminal problem.  IUU fishing generally takes one of three forms: 1) opportunistic 
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fishing interests that generally comply with the law but occasionally underreport their 
catches, 2) overfishing by vessels that are unaware of the law, and 3) overfishing by 
premeditated business interests (Telesetsky, 2014, 943-944).  Vessels involved in IUU 
fishing activities often have hazardous working conditions and fishermen are poorly 
compensated, making this line of work extremely dangerous (Schmidt, 2005, 481-482).  
IUU fishing has also been associated with organized crime networks.  Many vessels 
involved in IUU fishing target high value resources such as abalone or Caspian Sea 
sturgeon, many of which are sold in the black market (Liddick, 2014, 295).   In 2004, 
Japan imported $1 billion worth of seafood from Russia (Liddick, 2014, 295).  Official 
Russian documents indicated that fish exported to Japan was significantly less, indicating 
that much of the imported seafood had been illegally caught and sold to Japanese markets 
(Liddick, 2014, 295).  Caviar is another example where IUU fishing is seen.  As a high 
value resource, caviar can sell for as much as $500 per kilogram and its high demand and 
low legally allowable supply make it a strong commodity for organized crime syndicates 
to make major profits (Liddick, 2014, 295).  IUU fishing vessels have also been 
associated with drug and human trafficking and slavery (Liddick, 2015, 296). 
International Fisheries Law and Regional Fisheries Management Organizations 
 The foundations for the legal fishing regime have been established through 
UNCLOS, which went into effect November 1994 and lists states’ rights over exclusive 
economic zones (EEZs) (Henricksen and Hoel, 2011, 68).  Within a state’s EEZ, which is 
determined as 200 nautical miles from a state’s coastline, it has the sovereign rights to 
explore and exploit resources as well as manage and protect marine ecosystems.  The 
state can regulate which foreign vessels can operate within their EEZ, and states are 
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obligated to maintain fish stocks that can accommodate a sustainable but maximizing 
yield (Henricksen and Hoel, 2011, 68).  The international community has adopted a 
number of measures to combat IUU fishing, including: 1) the 2001 International Plan of 
Action to Prevent, Deter, and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing 
(IPOA-IUU), 2) the 2005 Model Scheme on Port State Measures to Combat Illegal, 
Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing, 3) the 2009 FAO Agreement on Port State 
Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, 
Flag State Performance (PSMA), and 4) the 2010 FFA Regional Monitoring, Control, 
and Surveillance Strategy (Kao, 2015, 3-6).  Under the PSMA, the flag state, is 
responsible to ensure that all vessels flying its flag are complying with international law.  
This can be done by allowing port states to inspect a flag state’s ships believed to be 
involved in IUU fishing, taking authoritative measures to deter IUU fishing, and 
reporting enforcement action to port states (Erickstein and Swan, 2014, 127-128).  Port 
states have responsibilities under PSMA as well, including inviting a flag state to inspect 
a vessel involved in IUU fishing, reporting findings to regional fishery management 
organizations, and denying port access to vessels believed to be engaging in IUU fishing 
(Erickstein and Swan, 2014, 128-129). 
 High global demand for fish has already placed considerable pressure on fish 
stocks within EEZs to the point where stocks are nearly depleted, exploited, and 
unsustainable.  Vessels increasingly must catch their supply in international waters and 
many of these fish stocks have been fully exploited as well, making IUU fishing more 
prevalent (Sodik, 2008, 134).  Governments often give the fishing industry subsidies that 
provide incentive to vessels to overfish, meaning much of the overfishing and 
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unsustainability of the world’s fisheries has resulted from legal fishing (Sodik, 2008, 
135). 
 The principles laid out in UNCLOS also obligate states to regulate transboundary 
fish stocks, or those fish stocks upon which several states rely for resources (Henricksen 
and Hoel, 2011, 68).  Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs) are the 
principal governance mechanisms overseeing the management and sustainability of 
fisheries.  Participating states can create the rules and regulate foreign fishing vessels 
similar to how states enforce trade-related sanctions (Riddle, 2006, 266; Muir, 2010, 373; 
Liddick, 2014, 304).  Through RFMOs, fish stocks are considered a common pool of 
resources which is susceptible to the “tragedy of the commons,” meaning that these 
resources can be severely depleted if steps are not taken to manage the resource 
(Henricksen and Hoel, 2011, 66-67).  The RFMO is responsible for managing this 
resources and ensuring sustainability for all its parties.  The RFMO has the ability to 
determine the allocation and restrictions on all parties to the organization (Henricksen 
and Hoel, 2011, 66-67).  Overall, state compliance through RFMOs still remains the 
largest problem hindering the international community’s ability to combat IUU fishing, 
but states have adopted stronger measures and been more effective at coordinating their 
efforts (Erickstein and Swan, 2014, 129; Telesetsky, 2014, 947).  Many of the most 
important RFMOs include: 1) the Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin 
Tuna (CCSBT), 2) The Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO), 3) the 
Northeast Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC), 4) the Commission for the 
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), 5) the Indian Ocean 
Tuna Commission (IOTC), 6) the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC), 
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7) the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC), and 8) the 
International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) (Liddick, 
2014, 304-305). 
 In 1999, the FAO agreed on an International Plan of Action to combat IUU 
fishing (IPOA-IUU) (Riddle, 2006, 269).  The IPOA-IUU is a non-legally binding 
agreement that recommends that states take necessary steps to implement better fishery 
maintenance at the national level (Sodik, 2008, 131).  The IPOA-IUU tasked nations to 
implement national plans of action to combat IUU fishing to allow better management of 
global fisheries and to enforce those national laws on fishing operations taking place 
within their national jurisdictions (Riddle, 2006, 271-272).  National plans of action are 
needed to implement effective enforcement mechanisms in order to deter IUU fishing 
within their national boundaries and develop monitoring, control, and surveillance 
mechanisms to ensure sustainable fish populations within their national boundaries and 
within EEZs (Riddle, 2006, 273).  States are also recommended to coordinate these tasks 
with each other, either bilaterally or through RFMOs, to enhance capabilities of all states 
to effectively manage fisheries (Riddle, 2006, 274).  The most important task states need 
to implement are port state measures that require fishing vessels to document where their 
catches originated and provide verifiable documentation of this.  States would be 
authorized to deny entry of vessels involved in IUU fishing activities which would ensure 
that illegally caught fish would not enter the market (Riddle, 2006, 281).   
 Properly managing fish stocks remains one of the most difficult challenges facing 
RFMOs and there are three conditions that account for this.  One of these challenges 
includes the migratory nature of many fish species; many RFMOs do not correspond with 
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the jurisdictional boundaries of states outlined by UNCLOS (Henricksen and Hoel, 2011, 
67).  Second, many fish stocks are subject to volatile fluctuations in size and number of 
species which may be a result of poor management of the fishery or breeding habits of 
certain species (Henricksen and Hoel, 2011, 67).  Finally, some species may be subject to 
even more restrictive regulations based on a certain species’ importance in the balance 
and longevity of the ecosystem.  By fishing for these types of species, the entire 
ecosystem can die out (Henricksen and Hoel, 2011, 67). 
In the 1990s, the Patagonian Toothfish, known as Chilean Seabass in US markets, 
was a common target for IUU fishing activities due to its high market value and lax 
enforcement in that part of the world (Riddle, 2006, 267).  The high market rate per 
pound made the Patagonian Toothfish a valuable target of fishermen almost overnight.   
The regional fishery management organization with jurisdiction over that portion of the 
sea was overwhelmed and concerned about the future sustainability of fish stocks 
(Riddle, 2006, 267).  IUU fishing in these waters threatened the species’ existence as well 
as the management capacity of the fishery tasked to maintain fish stocks (Riddle, 2006, 
267).  The Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources 
(CCAMLR) implemented a catch documentation scheme; the RFMO retained a “white 
list,” or RFMO-approved list, of vessels that were granted the right to fish for the 
toothfish in those waters (Liddick, 2014, 306).  As a result, CCAMLR reported a 
significant drop in illegal toothfish catches from 33,000 tons in 1997 to 3,600 tons in 
2004 (Liddick, 2014, 306). 
 In another location, the states along the Mediterranean Sea faced a severe 
overfishing problem, including IUU fishing, which was leading to severe environmental 
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degradation that hampered the sustainability of fishing along these transboundary waters 
(Ozturk, 2015, 68).  As a result, INTERPOL led an effort called Project Scale to 
coordinate with the states along the Mediterranean Sea to combat IUU fishing (Ozuturk, 
2015, 81).  Mediterranean Sea fish stocks were over 65% depleted and led to other major 
problems such as loss of tax revenue, loss of income, job insecurity, loss of biodiversity, 
and the emergence of ghost fisheries (resulting from abandoned nets) (Ozuturk, 2015, 
81).  Ghost fisheries, which are created by fishermen abandoning their nets at sea when 
coast guard patrols are nearby, have presented a unique challenge for the region.  
Abandoned nets cause environmental disaster as they sink and float the waters, catching 
many species of fish unintentionally and getting caught in ship’s propellers, making 
travel through the Mediterranean much more difficult (Ozuturk, 2015, 82).  Most states in 
this region are members of the European Union, therefore have similar fishing 
regulations, but states outside of the EU have also adopted similar measures to enhance 
cooperation and information sharing in order to provide better enforcement of regional 
fishing standards (Ozuturk, 2015, 70).  However, cooperation has mostly been 
coordinated among EU member states which have issued regulations in 2010 specifically 
coordinated to “to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated 
fishing” (Ozuturk, 2015, 82-83). 
 A similar RFMO has been established in the waters of Southeast Asia.  In 2007, 
11 countries in the region, including Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste and 
Vietnam, established a Regional Plan of Action (RPOA) to Promote Responsible Fishing 
Practices with the goal to manage the region’s fish stocks and deter IUU fishing (Johns, 
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2013, 112).  Indonesia in particular are one of the most biodiverse waters in the entire 
world, comprising 3000 species of fish within its territorial waters but lack of 
enforcement capabilities has rendered the country helpless to IUU fishing (Dirhamsyah, 
2012, 44).  Southeast Asia’s IUU fishing problem has been driven from population 
growth, higher market demand for fish globally, and poverty among communities that 
rely on fishing for income.  The countries that are a party to the RPOA represent 17% of 
fish caught globally, or 14 million tons of fish, in an industry estimated at around $10 
billion (Johns, 2013, 113).  Approximately 4 million tons of fish are caught as a result of 
IUU fishing (Johns, 2013, 113).  These amounts could be much higher due the 
pervasiveness of IUU fishing in Southeast Asia’s waters (Dirhamsyah, 2012, 45).  Much 
of the IUU fishing activity in the region within coral reefs as vessels seek to capture live 
reef fish due their high demand and expensive price (Dirhamsyah, 2012, 45). 
Fishing vessels may also employ prohibited methods of capturing fish such as the 
use of cyanide or dynamite, the use of which is illegal in most countries for commercial 
fishing (Dirhamsyah, 2012. 46).  The RPOA focuses on three main objectives “(i) 
strengthening legal, administrative and policy frameworks, (ii) strengthening 
regional/international cooperation, and (iii) enhancing capacity building and training. 
Countries report annually to the Coordination Committee on progress” (Johns, 2013, 
114).  This includes a monitoring, control, and surveillance program as a means of 
gathering intelligence from the catching sector to monitor the fishery’s health and 
sustainability, making sure that all vessels operating within the region are complying with 
the fishery’s management policies (Johns, 2013, 114).  However, this RPOA has its 
limitations and has been mostly unsuccessful in its efforts.  A 2008 study concluded that 
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the RPOA was in danger due to lack of planning and management at both the internal and 
regional levels, lack of investment for capacity building and strengthening institutions, a 
reluctance to exchange information among members, and high costs of surveillance 
(Johns, 2013, 115).  The lack of enforcement in these waters and the lack of regulations 
governing the entire supply chain of live reef fish have allowed the fishing industry to 
remain unregulated (Dirhamsyah, 2012, 48).  
 These RFMO arrangements also allow consumers to know where they are buying 
their fish from.  Labeling schemes have been utilized as a means to identify which 
catches have been caught legally; such methods include product labeling and trade 
documentation to certify that the consumer is buying fish that has been caught legally 
(Schmidt, 2005, 482-483).  The European Union, for example, has adopted catch 
certification requirements that limit port access to third country ships and has compiled a 
list of ships known to be involved in IUU fishing (Liddick, 2014, 304).  However, not all 
member states have successfully implemented these requirements and IUU fishing is a 
persistent problem in Europe (LIddick, 2014, 304).  Part of the problem rests on improper 
product labeling, which may be unintentional because a particular catch may include 
similar species of fish and those that are responsible for mislabeling products are small-
scale retailers (Heylar, 2014, 2).  Studies in the UK identified that a significant portion of 
Atlantic cod products were actually Pacific cod, which makes it more difficult to 
maintain fish stocks globally and erodes consumer confidence in the industry (Heylar, 
2014, 4). 
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Domestic laws and State Capacity 
 Under UNCLOS, the flag state is responsible for exercising jurisdiction over ships 
flying its flag, while coastal states have the right to exercise jurisdiction over their EEZ 
and fishing resources.  Many of the problems regarding IUU fishing are due to the 
ineffectiveness of flag states to responsibly regulate ships flying their flag, which leaves 
coastal states, many of which lack enforcement capacity, with the burden to better control 
their waters (Elvestad and Kvalvik, 2015, 242-243).  In order to address these gaps 
between flag state and coastal state responsibilities to deal with IUU fishing, some states 
have adopted port state measures, which are regulations states can adopt to control which 
vessels have access to its ports.   This is widely seen as an effective way to deny market 
access to vessels believed to be involved in IUU activity (Elvestad and Kvalvik, 2015, 
241-242).  Port states retain the exclusive rights to regulate which foreign vessels can 
enter their ports, where vessels can be subject to inspection, enforcement, and where they 
can be reported and monitored by the port state for accurate records (Evelstad and 
Kvalvik, 2015, 243).  Individual states and regional organizations have also adopted 
market-based approaches to combat IUU fishing by denying market access to vessels or 
states believed to be undermining the fishing industry and conservation from IUU fishing 
activities.  These measures are meant to dissuade profits obtained from IUU fishing 
(Evelstad and Kvalvik, 2015, 243). 
 Europe produces and imports about $1.25 billion worth of fish annually and has 
created a robust system to combat IUU fishing that is far more encompassing than 
measures directed under international law through the FAO recommendations and the 
International Plan of Action on IUU fishing of 2001 (IPOA-IUU) (Stanciu and Feher, 
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2010, 62).  The EU has developed a regulatory framework based on the IPOA-IUU and 
addresses IUU fishing that occurs in the European Community’s waters, EEZs and waters 
covered by RFMOs, and fishing that occurs in international waters in breach of 
international law regarding flag state responsibilities (Muir, 2010, 376-377).  The 
measures above have been adopted by the European Union which requires that all fish 
products be accompanied by a catch certificate provided by the flag state to trace the 
origin of the catch, where it is processed, and the quantity of the total catch of any foreign 
fishing vessel operating within EU territory (Evelstad and Kvalvik, 2015, 244; Tsamenyi, 
2010, 6; Stanciu and Feher, 2010, 63-64).  Foreign fishing vessels are required to abide 
by EU laws on fishing and comply with the terms applicable for a proper catch 
certificate, which includes provisions that the flag state must certify that the catch was 
made with accordance to EU laws and include all documents related to the transshipment 
of products.  Flag states that do not comply with EU law can be censured and their 
licenses revoked and exporters must request catch certificates from the flag state for all 
catches that are sent to the EU and other European countries (Evelstad and Kvalvik, 
2015, 244-245; Stanciu and Feher, 2010, 63).  The system adopted by the EU is designed 
to increase communications between states, coordinate with each other for better 
monitoring and ensuring sustainability of Europe’s fisheries, restore consumer trust, and 
make market conditions fairer for commercial fishermen (Stanciu and Feher, 2010, 62-
63).  This system requires effective communication among member states, the EU 
Commission, and authorities in third countries, but transparency has been generally weak 
and the full implementation of EU requirements has not been achieved.  Records are not 
made public and there lacks a central database to record information on infractions, catch 
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totals, or other relevant information which would increase the success of a RFMO 
(Evelstad and Kvalvik, 2015, 248-249).  
Accounting for 7% of all fish captured within and beyond a state’s EEZ, tuna are 
an important part of the fishing export business (Yann-huei, 2009, 107).  Tuna are also 
highly migratory and consist of seven main species subject to international agreements 
(Yann-huei, 2009, 107).  Japan, which is one of the largest consumers and importers of 
tuna, had been importing vast quantities of IUU caught tuna from Taiwan (Yann-huei, 
2009, 122-123).  In 1999, both countries entered into a joint agreement to limit the 
number of large-scale tuna long-line fishing vessels (LSTLVs) in operation as a means to 
combat IUU fishing.  Japan would limit the number of licenses issued to LSTLVs and 
Taiwan had agreed to repatriate 60 of their ships (Yann-huei, 2009, 132-133).  Many of 
these ships were able to escape these arrangements (Yann-huei, 2009, 132-133).  The 
system developed by the Atlantic Tuna RFMO, ICCAAT, which oversees tuna catches 
globally, has been criticized for not strengthening its rules on tuna catches, which has 
resulted in increased catches of smaller, younger fish and restricted species including sea 
turtles (Yann-huei, 2009, 138). 
This case study on IUU fishing demonstrates that despite the prevalence of 
international institutions, the great powers are not coordinated and the lack of resources 
provided to combat IUU fishing has created a dismal response.  To the great powers, 
combatting IUU fishing may be important, but not as important as other national 
interests.  States are therefore unaligned and the responses are uneven.  There will come a 
point when the world’s major fisheries can no longer feed the world and oceanic 
ecosystems will be so unbalanced that future recovery would never be possible.   
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Chapter 6: Evidence, Conclusion, and Recommendations 
The case studies presented earlier in this thesis demonstrate that good governance 
over the oceans will vary depending on: 1) states’ political will to work with each other, 
2) the way that international law structures regimes and institutions, 3) the degree in 
which states have adopted international law into their own domestic framework, and 4) 
the capability that states have to enforce the rule of law. 
 States which lack enforcement capabilities provide the conditions that allow 
piracy to thrive.  Somalia in particular had a serious piracy problem and the international 
community coordinated with one another in order to combat the threat.  The waterways 
around Somalia are of global strategic importance for trade and the great powers were 
particularly affected by the scale in which pirates were suffocating trade routes.  The 
members of the Security Council invoked Chapter VII of the UN Charter which 
authorized the use of force in Somalia to fight piracy.  The five permanent members of 
the Security Council demonstrated that they all had a vested interest in securing trade 
routes and they all provided the necessary resources towards this end.  The great powers 
then worked with smaller states around Somalia to increase judicial and penal capacity to 
prosecute pirates and incarcerate them.  To this day, the international community still 
patrols the waters off Somalia’s coast to deter piracy, which has significantly decreased 
in recent years. 
 Combatting piracy in other parts of the world has not been as successful as the 
campaign in Somalia.  The fundamental problem is the lack of political will to combat 
piracy in other areas.  In the Strait of Malacca, Indonesia and Malaysia have been 
reluctant to work with other states who can provide naval resources to fight piracy for 
fear that they may lose their sovereignty.  Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea is likely to 
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continue to thrive because the great powers do not have a vested interest to commit 
resources in an area that does not have important trade routes.  The second problem that 
the international community faces in fighting piracy in these parts of the world is due to 
state sovereignty and UNCLOS.  Piracy in these areas mostly takes place within 
territorial waters so the international community does not have the jurisdiction to 
intervene unless an incident is in international waters or if the Security Council 
authorizes the use of force.  States that offer sanctuary to pirates also do not have the 
judicial or enforcement resources necessary to deter piracy and must rely on other states 
to increase these capabilities. 
 Management of the world’s fisheries is a classic common pool resources problem.  
Many of the world’s most important fisheries have already reached unsustainable levels.  
States have demonstrated some political will in managing fisheries through the creation 
of numerous RFMOs.  Regional fisheries management organizations set the rules on who 
can fish, catch limits, and the rules governing how to deal with vessels or states that are 
not in compliance.  However, these arrangements are nonbinding on the parties and are 
subject to numerous enforcement problems.  Illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing 
has only exaggerated the severity in which global fisheries can be maintained at 
sustainable levels.  There is very little effort among states to enforce RFMO regimes; 
states may have diverging or competing interests to make sure they can continue to catch 
fish and sell it to domestic markets at as little cost as possible. 
Despite the international laws in effect that allow states to issue licenses or limit 
access to ports, weaker states lack the capacity to police their shorelines.  Weaker states 
also have not implemented RFMO frameworks fully in order to be in compliance.  Large 
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scale fishing operations exploit these weaknesses to meet market demands for their 
domestic customers.  States with more enforcement capacity are not faced with this 
dilemma since they have the domestic laws, courts, and incarceration capacity to prevent 
IUU fishing within their territorial waters or EEZs.  In order to provide a more 
comprehensive approach to combat IUU fishing, stronger states would have to shoulder a 
much greater burden in order to protect fisheries that they share with weaker states. 
In order to fight crime on the seas there are four necessary criteria that must be 
met in order to provide an environment where good governance can be ensured.  First, 
states must have the political will to align their interests and be willing to provide 
resources towards these shared goals.  In the case of piracy this means recognizing which 
bodies of water are most important to global trade and understanding how a limited 
ability to navigate international waters hinders trade and increases prices on goods.  In 
IUU fishing, the political will is demonstrated by understanding that the world’s fisheries 
are at unsustainable levels and knowing that in order to solve a common pool resources 
problem, collective action is necessary.  Secondly, the international law that exists to deal 
with these issues must address how to combat crime and must recognize that state 
sovereignty issues may hinder a more robust strategy.  International law must be designed 
to include responsibilities of great powers and weaker states and develop a cohesive 
strategy that allows the parties to increase overall capacity.  Third, states must have the 
domestic legal and judicial resources to implement international law at the domestic 
level.  In many cases, this requires that weaker states coordinate with stronger states to 
enhance their resources and capabilities.  Tackling corruption is also necessary to provide 
weaker states with the capacity to enhance their law enforcement capacity.  Finally, states 
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must have the law enforcement or military capacity to deter criminal activity to protect 
themselves from non-state actors which threaten stability and to ensure that their citizens 
are in compliance to the law. 
I would like to provide a few recommendations for the international community to 
consider in support of better governing practices in both case studies.  Regional 
approaches to combatting piracy and IUU fishing can provide a solid foundation that 
would enhance states’ capabilities.  The states that are most affected by these activities 
can pool their resources to reduce the costs and burdens and it would provide the space in 
which information and intelligence can be shared among a regional group’s members.  
By distributing these costs, states would have the ability to tackle corruption and 
strengthen domestic institutions and laws that address these problems.  Endemic 
corruption and weak state law enforcement capacity allows piracy and IUU fishing to 
flourish. 
Additionally regional frameworks can also provide the ability to engage strong 
partners which may have the resources to aid in tackling criminal activity.  Weaker states 
plagued by corruption and poorly functioning institutions may not have the ability to 
effectively enforce their coasts for criminal activity.  However, regional frameworks that 
allow these states to coordinate their efforts by teaming up with stronger states may offer 
the ability to fill these enforcement gaps without necessarily infringing on sovereignty or 
undermining a government.  Regionally organized frameworks can allow for cross-border 
enforcement capabilities and provide the means to for cooperation that allows for weaker 
states to access the resources and technology necessary to strengthen their own 
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enforcement capabilities.  By working regionally to address these problems, states will be 
able to improve conditions globally. 
These arrangements can also be strengthened by inviting the developed world as 
partners.  Developed countries already have the capabilities to protect their coasts and 
manage their resources more effectively.  If the developed world can be included in 
regional groups that address piracy and IUU fishing, it can enhance the regional group’s 
overall capacity to enforce international and domestic laws more effectively.  Technology 
and insight on addressing these issues can also be transferred from stronger states to 
developing states to allow for better policing of international waters.  Bringing in the 
developed world to address these issues is necessary because they have a vested interest 
in the freedom of navigation and the sustainable management of resources. 
The developed world does have an indirect interest in curbing piracy and IUU 
fishing.  Weak countries that suffer as victims for these crimes find themselves in 
unsustainable economic conditions, which in turn are forcing their citizens to migrate to 
the more economically developed countries of Europe and North America.  As we have 
seen, massive migration has strained their economies as well.  We live in a global 
community now where cooperation and political will must be shared for the common, 
sustainable health of the whole. 
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